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52 PEoPLE tJ. ODLE [37 C.2d 
[Crin. ~I'). 5156. In Bank. Apr. 'n, 1951.J 
THE PEOPi.E, Respondent, v. JOHN CALVIN ODLE, 
Appellant. 
[1] ilomicid&-:tr.dence.-A first degree murder conviction is 
sustained 11) evidence, among other things, that defendant, 
after tellmg !riends that he would kill his estranged wife if she 
refused to p.~lltJ1 to him, went to her place of employment, 
asked her ~~ her employer to accompany him to a back room, 
shot her se~~a: times and later confessed to killing her with 
a gun purebu",d for such purpose. 
[2] Criminal 14 .. - Appeal- Modification of Judgment. - Pen. 
Code, § 12'J., does not vest power in an appellate court to 
modify a ju':~:,ent in the absence of error in th. proceedings. 
[3] Id.-Appeal-!.eduction of Punishment Imposed.-The 1949 
amendment I"~ Pen. Code, § 1260, adding "or reduce the degr~ 
of the offl:1..>,I; or the punishment imposed" to the various 
actions an t.{>pellate court may take after reviewing a judg-
ment or oro"·,, did no more than bring the amended section 
into accord "'jth Pen. Code, § 1181(6), with respect to reduc-
ing the degr~ bf an offense, and make clear that the appellate 
court may Fl:docc the punishment in lieu of ordering a new 
trial when th',rl: is error relating to the punishment imposed. 
[4] Homicide - Appeal- Modification of Judgment.-In the ab-
sence of error, the Supreme Court has no power to substitute 
a sentence 1<, life imprisonment for a death penalty imposed 
by the trial court in its discretion under Pen. Code, § 190, 
upon a cODvir:tion of first degree murder in a trial in which 
a jury was \Waived. 
APPEAL (aut{Jmatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239) 
from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County. 
Robert Gardner, Judge. Affirmed. 
Prosecution fCJr murder. Judgment of conviction imposing 
death penalty, affirmed. 
[2] See 8 Cal.Jur. 636; 3 Am.Jur. 679. 
[3] Reduction by appellate court of punishment imposed by 
trial court, notes, 29 A.L.R. 313; 89 A.L.R. 295. 
McK. Dig. :.l.eferences: [1] Homicide, § 145(2); [2,3] Criminal 
Law, § 1446; [4] Homicide, § 273. 
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Fred N. Howser and Edmund G. Brown, Attorneys General, 
and Frank Richards, Deputy Attorney General, for Re-
spondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-This appeal is from a judgment imposing 
the death penalty following the conviction of defendant of 
first degree murder. 
Defendant and deceased were married in Huntington Park, 
California, on April 6, 1947. They lived together in Santa 
Ana, California, where defendant was employed. Shortly 
before Christmas, 1948, deceased became a saleslady and de-
partment manager for Davis Stationers on East Fourth Street 
in Santa Ana. Early in March, 1950, deceased left defendant 
and instituted divorce proceedings that resulted in the entry 
of an interlocutory decree of divorce in her favor on April 
25, 1950. Defendant repeatedly importuned deceased to re-
turn to him, both before and after the entry of the decree. 
On April 10, 1950, he quit his employment, presumably be-
cause of his depression over the separation. Thereafter not 
only did he frequently visit his wife at Davis Stationers 'to 
persuade her toteturn to him,but during a great part of her 
working hours he stationed himself at the corner of Fourth 
and Main, where Davis Stationers was located, or across the 
street at points where he could observe his wife and she could 
see him. These activities were apparently designed to con-
vince her of his grief and the genuineness of his requests that 
she return to him. 
During this period, defendant enlisted the aid of several 
of their friends to persuade her to return to him. These ef-
forts were unavailing. About the time he quit his employ-
ment, defendant informed a friend that he intended to buy 
a gun and kill his wife unless she returned to him. On April 
13, 1950, he purchased the pistol with which he later killed 
his wife. After the purchase he repeated to several friends 
that he would kill his wife if she did not return to him. They 
informed defendant's wife of his threats, but she apparently 
din not take them seriously. 
On May 1, 1950, five days before the homicide, defendant 
encountered a friend on the street across from Davis Station-
ers. After some conversation about defendant's marital diffi-
culties and his grief at the separation, defenda.nt stated "Be 
) 
54 PEOPLE v. ODW: [37 C.2d 
sure and watch the newspapers for the next week or ten days. " 
The friend asked "Oh, is that so, John Y" Defendant replied 
"Yes, it is too bad, but tbat is just what it has to be." 
On the morning of May 6, 1950, the day of the homicide, 
defendant took some laundry to a cleaning and laundry agency 
that had done work for him for more than two years. He 
asked the proprietress to deliver the laundry to the Y.M.C.A., 
where he was then living, "because I don't believe I will be 
free to call for it." About 1 :30 p. m. that day, defendant 
entered Woolworth's on Main Street, across the street from 
Davis Stationers. He talked with the girl in charge of the 
candy counter and informed her that he was going across 
the street to see his wife, who had better not forget that he 
had a gun. 
Immediately thereafter, defendant crossed the street, en-
tered the Davis Stationers store and stood by the counter 
where his wife was working. Shortly after 2 p. m., defendant 
asked his wife and Mr. Davis, her employer, to accompany him 
to the stockroom in the rear of the store so that they might 
converse quietly. As they entered the stockroom, defendant 
repeated his plea for a reconciliation. She refused, and he 
then took the pistol from his pocket and shot her. As she 
fell forward he fired two more shots into her body and head. 
Mr. Davis ran out the back door just as defendant fired a 
shot at him that lodged in the door behind him. In the ensu-
ing excitement, defendant escaped out the back door. He went 
immediately to the Santa Ana police station and surrendered. I 
He told the desk officer in charge "I have just shot my wife. 
She is at the Davis Stationery Store. I have just shot my 
wife. Here, take this gun." After questioning by several I 
police officers, defendant signed a full confession that he had . 
killed his wife with the gun, which he had purchased for that 
purpose. 
Defendant pleaded not guilty and not guilty by reason of 
insanity and waived a trial by jury. It was stipulated that 
the evidence given in the trial on the plea of not guilty could 
be considered by the trial judge in the trial on the plea of 
not guilty by reason of insanity. Following testimony estab-
lishing the foregoing facts, defendant introduced without ob-
jection the testimony of a psychiatrist, Dr. Victor Parkin, to 
establish that defendant was mentally ill and therefore not 
capable of forming a clear intention to kill. Dr. Parkin con-
ceded that defendant's menta] illness did not meet the tests 
()f legal insanity, but stated that it precluded his formation 
-j 
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of an intention to kill "with the clarity of thought that would 
make him entirely guilty of an act of murder. Homicide, 
yes. " The trial court found defendant guilty of murder in 
the first degree, but reserved its decision fixing the penalty 
until after the trial on the plea of not guilty by reason of 
insanity. 
In that trial Dr. Robert Wyers, a psychiatrist called by the 
court, testified that in his opinion defendant was legally sane; 
that he knew the nature and consequences of the act of kill· 
ing his wife; that although he was in need of psychiatric 
treatment, he was not psychotic but was in fact classifiable 
as mentally normal; and that he was capable of planning the 
murder of his wife and executing his plan with full knowledge 
of what he was doing. The opinion of Dr. Wyers was corrobo· 
rated by Dr. William Musfelt, another psychiatrist called by 
the court, and by Dr. Hyman Tucker, a psychiatrist called by 
the prosecution. Defendant called no witnesses. The trial 
court thereupon found defendant sane and sentenced him to 
be executed. 
[1] The foregoing evidence is clearly sufficient to support 
the trial court's determination that defendant committed a 
wilful, deliberate, and premeditated murder and is therE'fore 
guilty of murder of the first degree. (Pen. Code, § 189.) De· 
fendant contends, however, that the trial court abused its 
discretion by imposing the penalty of death rather than life 
imprisonment, and that this court. has power under the 1949 
amendment to Penal Code, section -1260, to reduce the penalty 
to life imprisonment. 
That section provides: 
'c The court may reverse, affirm, or modify a judgment or 
order appealed from, 0" ,.educe the deg,.ee of the offense 0" 
the punishm.ent imposed, and may set aside, affirm, or modify 
any or all of the proceedings subsequent to, or dependent 
upon, such judgment or order, and may, if proper, order a 
new trial." (Italicized provisions added by Stats. 1949, ch. 
1309, § 1.) 
Before the amendment of section 1260 it was settled that 
this court had no power to review thE' exercisE' of the jury's 
or trial court's discretion in fixing thE' pE'nalty for first degree 
murder. (People v. Danielly, 33 Cal.2d 362. 383 f202 P.2d 
18] ; People v. Tuthill, 32 Ca1.2d 819. 827 f19S P.2d 505].) 
Similarly, it could not reweigh thE' E'vidence in determining 
whether the trier of fact had correctly decided the degree of 
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the offense, but could only order a rednetion in the degree if 
the evidence was legally inadequate to support the finding of 
the higher degree. (Pen. Code. § 1181 (6) ; People v. Thomas, 
25 CaJ.2d 880, 905 [156 P.2d 71; People v. Bender, 27 Ca1.2d 
164.186 [163 P.2d 8] ; People v. Valentine, 28 Cal.2d 121, 144 
[]69 P.2d ]).) It is necessary to determine, therefore, whether 
the amenoment to section ]260 was intended to broaden the 
scope of appellate review over the determination of the degree 
of the offense and the punishment therefor. 
In the light of the legislati've history of sections 1260 
and 1181 of the Penal Code, we have concluded that the 1949 
amendment was not intended to broaden the scope of appel-
late review. Before 1927 if it was determined on appeal that 
the evidence was insufficient to support a verdict of guilty 
of a higher degree of an offense but sufficient to support a 
verdict of a lower degree, the appellate court had no power 
to order a modification of the judgment but was required to 
reverse the judgment and order a new trial. (People v. Nagy, 
199 Cal. 235, 239 [248 P. 906].) At that time subdivision 6 
of section 1181 of the Penal Code provided that the trial court 
could grant a new trial when the verdict was contrary to law 
or evidence. To obviate the necessity of a new trial, when 
tIll' insufficiency of the evidence went only to the degree of 
the crime, the Legislature in 1927 amended section 1181 to 
provide for modification of the judgment either by the trial 
or appellate court when "the evidence shows the defendant 
to be not guilty of the deln'ee of the crime of which he was 
convicted. but guilty of a lesser degree thereof, or of a lesser 
crime included therein." (Pen. Code, § 1181 (6) ; see People 
v. Kelley. 208 Cal. 387, 391-392 [28] P. 609].) 
In 1949 the Special Crime Study Commission on Criminal 
Law and Procedure in its second progress report recommended 
a further amendment to Penal Code, section 1181, to obviate 
the necessity of granting new trials when the punishment 
fixed by the jury or trial court was not supported by the law 
or evidence. The commission stated, "At the present time a 
trial judge on the hearing of a motion for a new trial is au-
thorized in a proper case, in lieu of granting said motion, to 
modify the verdict so as to reduce the degree of the offense 
of which the defendant stands convicted but has no authority 
to change or modify the punishment in those cases in which 
the fixing of the punishment is part of the verdict. If sHch 
authority were vested in the trial court it is believed that in 
Apr. 1951] PEfJP...... v. OOLE 
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certain circumstances a new trial <11 the ('ntire cause might be 
avoided." (Seeond Progress Heport of the Special Crime 
Study Commissiun .>n Criminal Law and Procedure [March 7, 
1949] Proposal XXVIII, p. 20.) The pruposed amendment 
provided that this power, lIke that given in subdivision 6 of 
section 1181, should extend to any court to which the case 
mlght be appealed. To bring section 1260 in accord with 
subdIvision 6 and the proposed new subdivision, the commis-
sion recommended the amendment to section 1260 providing 
that the appellate court might reduce the degree of the offense 
or the punishment imposed. (Proposal XXIX, p. 21.) 
Although the Legislature failed to pass the proposed amend-
ment to section 1181 but did enact the amendment to section 
1260, it is nevertheless clear from the legislative history that 
the amendment was designed, not to increase the scope of 
appellate review over the fixing of the degree or punishment 
of crime, but to bring section 1260 in accord with section 1181 
with regard to the reduction of the degree of crime and to 
make clear that the appellate court can reduce the punishment 
rather than grant a new trial when the evidence does not 
support the punishment imposed . 
. In view of the holding before the 1927 amendment to sec-
tion 1181, that the court could not modify a judgment to 
correct the degree of the crime fixed by a jury (People v. 
Nagy, supra, 199 Cal. 235, 239), the Legislature may have 
been fearful that the same rule would apply when the evi-
dence was insufficient to support the punishment imposed. For 
example, section 209 of the Penal Code provides for different 
punishments depending on whether or not the victim of a 
kidnapping suffers bodily harm. Under the rule of the Nagy 
case, assuming its applicability, an appellate court could not 
modify the punishment in lieu of ordering a new trial when 
the jury specified the greater punishment and there was no 
evidence that the victim suffered bodily harm. A comparable 
situation might have arisen under sections 192 and 193 of 
the Penal Code, which make the punishment for manslaughter 
in the driving of a vehicle depend on whether or not there was 
gross negligence. 
[2] Section 1260 now makes clear that the court can re-
duce the punishment in lieu of ordering a new trial, when 
the only error relates to the punishment imposed. It does 
not, howt'ver, vest power in thr court to modify a judgment 
in the absence of error in the proceedings. It lists the vari-
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the offense, but could only order a reduction in the degree if 
the evidence was legally inadequate to support the finding of 
the higher degree. (Pen. Code. § 1181(6); People v. Thomas, 
25 Ca1.2d 880, 905 [156 P.2d 71; People v. Bender. 27 Ca1.2d 
164,186 [163 P.2d 8] ; People v. Valentine, 28 Cal.2d 121, 144 
[169 P .2d 1].) It is necessary to determine, therefore, whpther 
the amendment to section 1260 was intended to broaden the 
scope of appellate review over the determination of the degree 
of thc offense and the punishment therefor. 
In the light of the legislative history of sections 1260 I 
and 1181 of the Penal Code, we have concluded that the 1949 
amendment was not intended to broaden the scope of appel-
late review. Before 1927 if it was determined on appeal that 
the evidence was insufficient to support a verdict of guilty 
of a higher degree of an' offense but sufficient to support a 
verdict of a lower degree, the appellate court had no power 
to order a modification of the judgment but was required to 
reverse the judgment and order a new trial. (People v. Nagy, 
199 Cal. 235, 239 [248 P. 906].) At that time subdivision 6 
of section 1181 of the Penal Code provided that the trial court 
could grant a new trial when the verdict was contrary to law 
or evidence. To obviate the necessity of a new trial. when 
the insufficiency of the evidence went only to the degree of 
the crime. the Legislature in 1927 amended section 1181 to 
provide for modification of the judgment either by the trial 
or appellate court when "the evidence shows the defendant 
to be not guilty of the degree of the crime of which he was 
convicted, but guilty of a lesser degree thereof, or of a lesser 
crime included therein." (Pen. Code, § 1181 (6) ; see People 
v. Kelley. 208 Cal. 387, 391-392 r281 P. 609].) 
In 1949 the Special Crime Study Commission on Criminal 
Law and Procedure in its second progress report recommended 
a further amendment to Penal Code, section 1181, to obviate 
the necessity of granting new trials when the punishment 
fixed by the jury or trial court was not supported by the law 
or evidence. The commission stated, "At the present time a 
trial judge on the hearing of a motion for a new trial is au-
thorized in a proper case, in lieu of granting said motion, to 
modify the verdict so as to reduce the degree of the offense 
of which the defendant stands convicted but has no authority 
to change or modify the punishment in those cases in which 
the fixing of the punishment is part of the verdict. If such 
authority were vested in the trial court it is believed that in 
) 
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certain circumstances a new trial vI the I'lltire cause might be 
avoided." (Seeond Progress Report of the Special Crime 
Study Commission un Criminal Law and Procedure lMarch 7, 
1949] Proposal XXVIII, p. 20.) The proposed amendment 
provided that this power, hke that given in subdivision 6 of 
section 1181, should extend to any court to which the case 
might be appealed. To bring section 1260 in accord with 
subdIvision 6 and the proposE'd new subdivision, the commis-
sion recommendE'd the amendment to section 1260 providing 
that the appellate court might reduce the degree of the offense 
or the punishment imposed. (Proposal XXIX, p. 21.) 
Although the Legislature failed to pass the proposed amend-
ment to section 1181 but did enact the amendment to section 
1260, it is nevertheless clear from the legislative history that 
the amendment was designed, not to increase the scope of 
appellate review over the fixing of the degree or punishment 
of crime, but to bring section 1260 in accord with section 1181 
with regard to the reduction of the degree of crime and to 
make clear that the appellate court can reduce the punishment 
rather than grant a new trial when the evidence does not 
support the punishment imposed . 
. In view of the holding before the 1927 amendment to sec-
tion 11811 that the court could not modify a judgment to 
correct the degrE'€ of the crime fixed by a jury (People v. 
Nagy, supra, 199 Cal. 235, 239), the Legislature may have 
been fearful that the same rule would apply when the evi-
dence was insufficient to support the punishment imposed. For 
example, section 209 of the Penal Code provides for different 
punishments depending on whether or not the victim of a 
kidnapping suffers bodily harm. Under the rule of the Nagy 
case, assuming its applicability, an appellate court could not 
modify the punishment in lieu of ordering a new trial when 
the jury specified the greater punishment and there was no 
evidence that the victim suffered bodily harm. A comparable 
situation might have arisen under sections 192 and 193 of 
the Penal Code, which make the punishment for manslaughter 
in the driving of a vehicle depend on whether or not there waS 
gross negligence. 
[2] Section 1260 now makes clear that the court can re-
duce the punishment in lieu of ordering a new trial, when 
the only error relates to the punishment imposed. It does 
not, howE'ver, vest power in th(' court to modify a judgment 
in the absence of error in the proceedings. It lists the vari-
) 
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ous actions that an appellate court may take after reviewing 
an order or judgment. Thus, the court Illay "reverse, affirm, 
or modify" as well as "reduce the degree of the offense or 
the punishment imposed." The section does not purport to 
set forth any test for determining which of the various possi-
ble actions the court should take. It has never been seriously 
contended that this section vests the court with power to re-
verse a judgment, when the evidence supports it and there 
has been no error in the proceedings, nor has it been con-
tended that it vests the court with power to affirm a judg-
ment even though there is no evidence to support it or there 
has been other prejudicial error. Whatever action the court 
has taken with respect to a judgment or order has always 
depended on whether or not there was error in the proceed-
ings and if so whether the error was prejudicial. (Cal. Const., 
art. VI, § 4lj2') The 1949 amendment adding the words, 
"or reduce the degree of the offense or the punishment im-
posed" sets forth no different test for determining what ac-
tion the court should take and vests the court with no more 
power to reduce the degree of the offense or the punishment 
imposed than it has to "reverse, affirm, or modify a judgment 
or order appeaJed from." To construe the section otherwise 
would give the court clemency powers similar to those vested 
in the governor (Cal. Const., art. VII, § 1), and raise serious 
constitutional questions relating to the separation of powers. 
(Cal. Const., art. III, § 1; see In f'e McGee, 36 Ca1.2d 592,594 
[226 P.2d 1], and cases cited in 24 C.J.S. 1091, note 26.) 
[3] It cannot reasonably be concluded that by adding "or 
reduce the degree of the offense or the punishment imposed" 
to the various actions an appellate court may take after review-
ing a judgment or order, the Legislature intended radically 
to alter the scope of appellate review and permit the court 
in every case, regardless of error, to substitute its judgment 
for that of the trial court or jury. We hold, therefore, that 
the amendment did no more than bring section 1260 into 
accord with section 1181( 6) with respect to reduction of the 
degree of an offense and make clear that the court may reduce 
the punishment in lieu of ordering a new trial, when there is 
error relating to the punishment imposed. The test for de-
termining what action should be taken remains the same: 
was there prejudicial error in the proceedings' [4] When, 
8S in this case, the triaJ court is vested with discretion to 
determine the punishment (Pen. Code, § 190). and there has 
been no error, this court has no power to substitute its judg-
) 
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ment for that of the trial court. (People v. Danielly, supt"a, 
33 Cal.2d 362, 383; People v. Tuthill, supra, 32 Cal.2d 819, 
827.) 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., and Spence, J., 
concurred. 
SHENK, J.-I concur in the judgment but I do not agree 
with the definite implication in the majority opinion that this 
court has the power to reduce the punishment and thus com-
mute the sentence from death to life imprisonment even in 
the presence of error. The power of commutation of sentence 
and pardon is vested exclusively in the governor by section 1 
of article VII of the Constitution and even that power is cir· 
cumscribed by the provision in the same section that the chief 
executive may not extend executive c.Iemency by granting a 
commutation of sentence or a pardon to a person twice con· 
victed of a felony without the "written recommendation of a 
majority of the judges of the Supreme Court." The provi. 
sions of the Constitution are "mandatory and prohibitory." 
(Art. I, § 22.) When power is vested by the Constitution in 
one branch of the state government it is incompetent for 
another branch to exercise it. The latest expression of thi!': 
court on the subject is found in I'll, re McGee, 36 Ca1.2d 592 
[226 P.2d 1], where it was held that when a power has been 
expressly vested in the Legislature (in that ease to determine 
the qualifications of one of its members) the courts are with· 
out authority to assum<> jurisdiction over the controversy. 
It was there stated, at page 594: "The powers of the govern-
ment of the state are divided into the legislative, executive and 
judicial, and neither shall exercise the powers of the other 
'except as in this constitution expressly directed or permitted. ' 
(Cal. Const., art III, § 1.)" Here the power of commuta-
tion of sentence is expressly vested in the governor and it is 
beyond the power of the Legislature to transfer that function 
to the courts as was attempted by an amendment of section 
1260 of the Penal Code in 1949. There is no other provision 
of the Constitution, express or otherwise, directing or permit-
ting the courts to exercise the power thus vested in the chief 
executive. Section 4%" article VI (adopted in 1926), author-
izing the Legislature to grant to the courts of appellate juris-
diction the power to make findings contrary to or in addition 
to those made by the trial court does not by any manner of 
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means confer upon the Legislature the right to authorize this 
court to exercise the power of commutation of sentence and 
thus reduce the punishment from death to life imprisonment. 
Section' 956a of the Code of Civil Procedure (added in 1927) 
is the enactment designed to carry into effect the constitutional 
amendment of 1926. That amendment was first construed and 
applied in Tupman v. Haberkern (1929),208 Cal. 256 [280 P. 
970]. The power thus conferred on the courts applies only 
to cases where "trial by jury is not a matter of right or where 
a trial by jury has been waived. It This powl:r has never been 
exercised in criminal cases for the obvious reason that trial 
by jury in such cases is a matter of right and following a 
waiver of a jury trial the court is not authorized to make 
findings of fact as contemplated by sections 632 and 956a of 
the Code of Civil Procedure. In People v. Willison (1932), 
122 Cal.App. 760 [10 P.2d 766], it was rightly said, at pages 
762 and 763, with reference to the power to be exercised pursu-
ant to section 4% of the Constitution, that "It was 8'ot in-
tended that the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court should 
be permitted to make findings of fact and thereby change 
verdicts rendered in jury trials." (See, also, People v. Myers, 
122 Cal.App. 675 [10 P.2d 498].) 
Section 1181 (6) of the Penal Code was amended in 1927 
to authorize on appeal the reduction in the degree of the 
crime. There was and is no constitutional inhibition foreclos-
ing the Legislature from conferring that power. This court 
recognized that fact and first exercised the power in People 
v. Kelley (1929),208 Cal. 387 [281 P. 609]. There is a vast 
difference between a change in the degree of the crime under 
the law and the evidence and a change in the punishment. 
The former involves the application of the law to the facts 
and is the function of the court. The latter is a matter of 
executive clemency, a power exercisable exclusively by the 
governor under the Constitution and without restraint so far 
as the law and the facts are concerned, except, as stated, in 
the case of a recidivist. 
It is conceded by the majority that if there is no error in 
the record the court, under the authorities, may not reduce 
the punishment and thus commute the sentence from death 
to life imprisonment. When there is error it is a function of 
the court to determine whether that error, in view of the entire 
record, has resulted in a miscarriage of justice and is there-
fore prejudicial. If prejudicial error does not appear the 
judgment should be affirmed. If prejudicial error is deter-
Apr. 1951] PEOPLE tI. ODLE 
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mined to be present, it is the function and duty of the court 
to reverse the judgment or, in a proper case, to reduce the 
degree. There is no power in the chief executive to r~duce 
the degree. It is his function to commute the sentence from 
death to life imprisonment or to some lesser period of confine-
nwnt or to execute 8 pardon pursuant to the cOllstitutional 
section. The punishment is fixed in the first instance by the 
jury under proper instructions as to the law or by the court 
where a jury has been waived. Any change in the punishment 
thereafter either by commutation from death to life imprison-
ment or to a shorter period, is just as much the exclusive con-
stitutional function of the chief executive as the granting of 
a pardon, and I assume that no one would even intimate that 
by an amendment of the code the Legislature could transfer 
the pardoning power from the governor to the Supreme Court. 
SCHAUER, J.-I concur In the judgment. 
I do not agree with any implications in the majority opinion 
that within constitutional limitations the Legislature cannot, 
or that it has not, empowered this court to reduce punishment 
•• in the interest of justice" in any case in which it may 
appear necessary or proper so to do. 
The source ,of the legislative power is section 4% of article 
VI of the California Constitution.! The pertinent act of the 
Legislature is section 1260 of the Penal Code.2 
'Section 4%: "In all eases where trial by jury is not a matter of 
right or where trial by jury has been waived, the legislature may grant 
to any court of appellate jurisdiction the power, in its discretion, to 
make findings of fact contrary to, or in addition to, those made by 
the trial court. The legislature may provide that such findings may be 
based on the evidence adduced before the trial court, either with or 
without the taking of additional evidence by the court of appellate 
jurisdiction. The legislature may also grant to any court of appellate 
jurisdiction the power, in its discretion, for the purpose of making 
such findings or for any other purpose in the interest of justice, to 
take additional evidence of or concerning facts occurring at any time 
prior to the decision of the appeal, and to give or direct the entry of 
any judgment or order and to make such further or other orders as the 
ease may require." 
·Section 1260: "The court may reverse, affirm, or modify a judgment 
or order appealed from, or reduce the degree of the offense or the punish-
ment imposed, and may set aside, affirm, or modify any or all of the 
proceedings subsequent to, or dependent upon, such jndgment or order, 
and may, if proper, order a new trial." 
